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Abstract 
Quantitative risk assessment is accepted as a process safety management tool in many countries 
throughout the world. Risk-based legislation is implemented by national governmental bodies. 
These organizations are often under public scrutiny, which indicates a high degree of societal 
endorsement of the values. There are at least three themes that are commonly used in the 
development of many generally accepted and recognized risk criteria: (1) a comprehensive risk 
management program must address both individual and societal risk; (2) risk criteria for the 
public must be lower, i.e. more conservative, than those for the workforce since the workforce 
risk is considered to be voluntary; and (3) with respect to individual risk, new facilities should be 
held to a higher level of risk performance than existing facilities. For new facilities many 
opportunities exist to apply new/advanced risk reduction technologies. In contrast, societal risk 
criteria are universally identical for new and existing situations; i.e., where a potential exists for 
major accident events affecting large numbers of people, most regulators have judged that older 
facilities must meet the same standards as newer facilities. 
This paper evaluates various international risk criteria in use today, and evaluates their respective 
merits. It also provides suggestions for companies or countries considering implementing their 
own risk tolerability criteria. 
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Introduction to Risk Assessment 
Risk is defined in ISO 17776 [1] as the combination of the frequency of occurrence of an event 
and the consequences of that event. Accordingly, a risk-based approach considers both the 
frequency of occurrence and associated consequences of all outcomes that could lead to 
explosions, fires, and flammable and toxic dispersions in a hazardous process facility. Thus, this 
type of approach balances the results of a consequence-based approach by quantifying the 
frequencies of events leading to various consequences. The main purpose of a risk-based 
assessment, known as Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA), is to answer the following key 
questions: (1) What can go wrong? (2) How likely is it? (3) What are the impacts; (4) Is the risk 
tolerable?, and (5) If not, which are the most appropriate safeguards for reducing risk to a 
tolerable level?. Figure 01 illustrates a simplified QRA flowchart [2]. 
Figure 01: Simplified Quantitative Risk Assessment Flowchart 
 
The following contents describe the minimum criteria for conducting the four main steps during 
a QRA. Note that even though the main purpose of this paper is to address and provide guidance 
on risk tolerability criteria, it is important to define the following steps that describe the QRA 
process:  
 Hazard Identification: Loss Of Containment (LOCs) scenarios are identified via 
systematic unit-by-unit Process Hazard Analysis (PHA). The LOCs to be identified 
include any piece of equipment or piping capable of leading to or from a hazardous 
material or energy source.  
 Frequency Analysis: This is based on the estimation of the likelihood of occurrence of 
all LOCs identified during the hazard identification step. The frequency analysis can be 
conducted using historical data, specific plant data (if available), worldwide references 
with generic process equipment failure rates [3-6], and also developing detailed fault 
trees for defining specific LOCs; i.e., top events.  
 
 
 Consequence Analysis: Consequence modeling is performed in order to quantify the 
effects of LOCs previously identified. It is characterized based on: (1) the release sources 
of material or energy associated with the hazard being analyzed; and (2) the 
quantification of the impacts on a target of interest. To model the consequences of these 
events, the source strength, duration, and phase must be accurately determined. These 
quantities are functions of storage/process conditions and the thermo-physical properties 
of the chemical(s) in question and can be determined from fluid flow equations. Note that 
consequence analysis includes the identification and quantification of ALL potential 
outcomes that a hazardous release may cause. The Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
methodology is a valuable tool for identifying and quantify all potential outcomes.  
 Risk Evaluation: The risk evaluation (or Quantification of Risk) is both a function of the 
likelihood of occurrence (i.e., frequency analysis) of possible undesired events (i.e., 
hazard identification) and the magnitude of their associated consequences (i.e., 
consequence analysis). This step involves the characterization and estimation of 
individual and societal risk for both workers and public. These risk estimates should 
consider toxicity, thermal radiation, and overpressure hazards. 
 Risk Tolerability Criteria: Risk tolerability criteria for individual and societal risk is 
compared between the actual risk identified and the target risk to be achieved according 
to the ALARP (As Low As Reasonable Practicable) principle. 
*ALARP: the term ALARP arises from UK legislation, particularly the Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974 [7], which requires “Provision and maintenance of plant and systems of 
work that are, so far as is reasonably practicable, safe and without risks to health”. The phrase 
“So Far As is Reasonably Practicable” (SFARP) in this and similar clauses are interpreted as 
leading to a requirement that risks must be reduced to a level that is “As Low As is Reasonably 
Practicable”. The key question in determining whether a risk is ALARP is the definition of 
“reasonably practicable,” which is interpreted to mean: “Risk must be averted unless there is a 
gross disproportion between the costs and benefits of doing so”. 
 Risk Reduction: recommendations have to be proposed with the aim to minimize the 
actual risk level of the facility under analysis and comply with the applicable risk criteria. 
Additionally, recommendations intended to ensure effective management procedures, and 
recommendations that could improve the effectiveness and/or reliability of the system 
may also be considered. 
As a result, the individual risk and the societal risk are two key concepts defined below. 
 
 
Individual Risk Definition and Characterization 
The individual risk concept can be defined as the risk which considers the acceptability of a 
particular level of risk to an exposed individual; i.e., it is not a function of the total number of 
individuals placed in a given location. The individual risk can be graphically represented with 
Individual Risk Contours (IRCs) and it can be expressed as a single number or index, for 
example, for comparison purposes. When the goal is to determine the contribution level to the 
overall individual risk by one or more process units or by a specific type of hazard, the index 
Total Individual Risk (IRTOT) is sometimes used.  
 Individual Risk Contours (IRC): Iso-risk lines are overlaid on the site topography at 
locations where a hypothetical individual staying there for 24 hours per day and 365 days 
per year is subject to a defined probability of harm due to exposure to hazards from a 
LOC, or multiple LOCs. Risk contours are drawn by connecting points of equal risk 
where the risk is calculated by determining the consequences and frequency from a 
number of scenarios. By adopting certain criteria for harm (most often fatality) and by 
using, for example, the so-called probit equation for toxic substances, thermal radiation 
from fires, and explosion overpressure, effect distances can be determined from the origin 
of an event. Based on incident frequencies, presence of ignition sources, and effects from 
meteorological conditions (i.e., wind direction, wind speed, Pasquill stability distribution) 
the contribution from each scenario/event to a point at a distance from the event can be 
calculated. By creating a grid over the facility being analyzed and summing the 
contribution from all scenarios for each grid point, a three-dimensional graphical 
representation can be developed. This three-dimensional rendering is then reduced to a 
two-dimensional representation by connecting points of equal risk. Figure 02 illustrates 
an example of IRCs [8]. 
 Total Individual Risk (IRTOT): This index represents the results of the individual risk 
contours in a single number. The IRTOT is calculated by summing all individual risk 
values for each cell within the computational domain. This index is a good tool, for 
example, for quantifying the contribution percentage of individual process units in a 
hazardous chemical facility. This procedure favors the statistical analysis of the 
individual risk results and helps the risk mitigation decision-making process by 




Figure 02: Example of Risk Contours Representing Predicted Risk Levels 
 
Societal Risk Definition and Characterization 
The societal risk concept addresses the society’s aversion to accidents which can result in 
multiple fatalities; i.e., the societal risk takes into account the actual population present in a given 
area. The societal risk can be graphically represented by F-N Curves (i.e., Frequency – Number 
of fatalities curves) and it can be expressed using a single number or index. When the goal is to 
determine the contribution level to the overall societal risk by one or more process units or by a 
specific type of hazard, the indices “Potential Loss of Life” (PLL) or “Average Rate of Death” 
(ROD) are sometimes used. Note that PLL and ROD, defined below, are considered equivalent 
indices: 
 F-N Curves (FN): Societal risk is often depicted on a cumulative graph called an F-N 
curve. The horizontal axis is the number of potential fatalities. The vertical axis is the 
cumulative frequency F per year of N or more fatalities occurring. F-N curves are an 
indicator used by authorities as a measure of social disruption in case of large accidents. 
Because it is a cumulative curve, the curve always drops away (or has a negative slope) 
with increasing N. Figure 03 illustrates and example of FN Curve [9].  
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Figure 03: Example of FN Curve 
 
Potential Loss of Life (PLL) or Average Rate of Death (ROD): PLL or ROD is defined as the 
expected value of the number of fatalities per year (or over the life time of a project). PLL is a 
type of risk integral, being a summation of risk as expressed by the product of frequency and 
consequences; i.e., number of fatalities. The integral is summed over all the potential events that 
can occur. It is mainly used to compare options and enables the inclusion of different risk types 
like process, transport, and workplace hazards in one number. 
After introducing the individual and societal risk concepts, the following contents provide 
guidance and knowledge on worldwide risk tolerability criteria applicable to the Chemical 
Process Industry (CPI).  
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Some Thoughts on Risk Tolerability  
As the examination of risks presented by potentially hazardous facilities has advanced, so has the 
concept of what constitutes an acceptable risk. The phrase “acceptable risk” is widely used in 
QRA literature. However, it is a somewhat misleading phrase and it is more meaningful to talk 
about “risk tolerability”. Individuals may “accept” risk of an activity on a voluntary basis if they 
deem it is low enough and if they derive a benefit from it. For example, driving an automobile 
poses a small risk but most people are willing to “accept” that risk. However, when a risk from 
an activity is imposed on an individual on an involuntary basis and there are no perceived 
benefits that the individual gets from the activity, then no risk is truly “acceptable”, no matter 
how small.  For involuntary risks imposed on individuals the appropriate concept for decision 
makers is: “is the risk small enough to be tolerable?”. Accordingly, concepts used by various 
jurisdictions in the United States and elsewhere on what constitutes a “tolerable” risk are 
presented in this section. In particular, the interest is to define if a major chemical facility 
presents tolerable or intolerable risk to its surroundings. Almost all human endeavors entail some 
level of risk, so the decision to tolerate a risk will be balanced against the benefit derived. 
However, there must be some levels of risk which historically have been considered either 
tolerable or intolerable. These levels of risks vary between communities and individuals and 
depend on a number of factors. The most important causes that influence the decisions to be 
made on risk tolerability are:  
 Economic benefit: Individuals or communities who will receive direct economic benefit 
from an industrial site through increased employment or income will be more tolerant of 
the associated risk. Those who see no economic benefit are generally less tolerant. The 
cost of reducing risk by modifying the site influences the level of tolerable risk. If 
significant improvements can be achieved without losing too much of the economic 
benefit, these enhancements are normally required. Unfortunately, the perception of 
economic benefit and cost varies between individuals, local communities, safety 
authorities, governments and developers. 
 Amenities: Individuals and communities are generally intolerant of activities that will be 
visually intrusive, noisy, and smelly or pollution threats. Improved amenities, such as 
better roads or public transport, usually have no influence on risk tolerability. 
 Voluntary or involuntary risk: Individuals who move into an area have generally made 
a voluntary decision to accept the existing risk, provided the risk has been previously 
identified. Additional risk associated with new developments are frequently considered 
involuntary risks that can only be avoided at a great cost, such as by moving away from 
the area. Consequently, involuntary risk is much less tolerable than voluntary risk. 
 “Visible risk”: Where risk is concentrated in a local area, for example in a coal mining 
community, the impact of an accident will be very visible and deeply felt. This can be 
contrasted with road accidents, or disease, where isolated individuals are affected and 
there is little concentration of risk on communities. Generally, society will expend greater 
efforts to reduce the visible risks despite the fact that more lives are lost by other causes.  
 
 
 Size of potential accidents: Accidents which injure or kill large numbers of people 
attract more interest than individual incidents that kill the same number of people. 
Likewise, activities which have the potential to cause multiple injuries/fatalities are less 
likely to be tolerated, even if the probability of such an accident is extremely low. 
Evaluating Risk Tolerability 
Two basic approaches exist to evaluate risk tolerability criteria. The more traditional approach, 
used by numerous industries, is policy-driven and qualitative in nature. The other approach, used 
more extensively in Europe in various industries and under consideration in the United States by 
some major chemical companies, is quantitative and involves the development of numerical 
criteria for measuring risk tolerability. Although both approaches have certain advantages and 
disadvantages, the quantitative approach contains the characteristics that lead to a sound and 
long-term risk management program. 
Qualitative Approach 
Evaluation of qualitative risk tolerability can be based on the principle-based approach, or the 
procedural or checklist approach.  
On one hand, the principle-based approach typically centers on a formalized code of ethics that 
allows all levels of decision making within an organization to use the same guidelines when 
judging risk. Examples of statements that might be included in such a code are: 
 The company will not expose its employees or neighbors to risks that are considered 
intolerable, based on general practices and available technology.  
 The company will comply with all applicable regulations and guidelines related to acute 
risks, and will adopt its own standards where regulations do not exist or are inadequate or 
incomplete. 
 Any system or part of a system which failing can lead directly to fatalities or major 
injuries, and will be considered to be critical to safety and will undergo more rigorous 
analysis. Furthermore, risk reduction measures will be applied if it is deemed necessary. 
A serious disadvantage of this approach is that principles such as those listed above are subject to 
broad interpretation, resulting in an inconsistent decision-making process.  
On the other hand, the checklist approach involves developing an exhaustive list of factors that 
must be qualitatively examined in all risk-tolerability decisions. Such factors are usually 
correlated with: (1) activities; (2) demographics of the area of operations; or (3) issues such as 
public perception. Examples of activity related factors are: (a) Chemicals used and produced and 
the degree of hazard for each; (b) Number of required loading/unloading, movements, and 




The checklist approach officially considers most areas and issues correlated with risk. However, 
it does not provide enough guidance or control over how thorough these areas/issues are 
addressed or understood. 
Generally, qualitative approaches to risk-tolerability evaluation have a good chance of 
acceptance both within the organization and externally because the goals are broad and 
uncontentious. In addition, existing operations are likely to be found compliant with such goals. 
However, compliance does not necessarily mean that the public or the applicable control 
agencies will find such operations tolerable in terms of the risks they perceive. Thus, qualitative 
approaches can fail in important ways: (1) Qualitative goals generally do not provide any 
assistance in managing risk levels, particularly for existing operations; i.e., they cannot indicate 
how safe is safe enough; (2) They can be circumvented during the evaluation process; (3) They 
do not ensure consistency in risk decision making; and (4) They may tend to become 
methodologies for qualitative support of risk decisions, rather than actual policies for sound risk 
management. 
Quantitative Approach 
The quantitative approach to evaluate risk tolerability involves developing a set of numerical 
criteria that can be used with the standard representations of risk contours, F-N curves, and 
individual risk estimates to determine whether additional mitigation measures are needed. A 
QRA is used to determine the overall risk levels, which are then compared to the applicable risk 
tolerability criterion. QRA is a methodology that identifies potential mishaps, determines their 
expected chances of occurrence, evaluates their potential impact, and then translates all this 
information into overall risk results. Numeric criteria for human safety is often based on fatalities 
rather than injuries, largely because the data on fatalities is considered more accurate. The Health 
and Safety Executive [10] adopted a criterion based on dangerous dose, which attempts to 
address the problem of estimating fatality rates from an incident. Numeric criteria such as these 
must be applied with caution because they represent goals or targets, rather than universally 
accepted limits, standards, or requirements. Therefore, any judgment regarding the tolerability of 
a risk must also: (1) Consider the uncertainty of the risk estimate; and (2) Address the various 
qualitative issues affecting public perception. 
Quantitative risk-tolerability criteria may be applied absolutely or relatively. With absolute 
applications, numerical criteria are treated as standards with which operations within an 
organization must comply. With relative applications, risks are evaluated against numerical 
criteria on a case-by-case basis. Compared with absolute applications, relative applications are 
less rigid and allow room for judgment. Even with this element of subjectivity, relative 
applications, if done prudently, can avoid inconsistencies and result in sound decisions. 
Furthermore, decisions made on the basis of relative applications of numerical criteria may be 
less subject to external criticism. This is mostly because the specific factors to be considered are 
not as identifiable as factors to be taken into account in absolute applications. 
The quantitative approach to evaluate risk tolerability has several advantages and disadvantages 




Table 01: Advantages and Disadvantages of Quantitative Approach 
Advantages of Quantitative Approach Disadvantages of Quantitative Approach 
It is an explicit statement of policy 
The public has not yet demonstrated complete 
confidence in the use of numerical criteria for 
assessing the tolerability of risks and may 
criticize a particular number. 
The full site of an organization can be 
measured for compliance with the criteria. 
Existing operations may not be able to meet 
such specific criteria as easily as new ones 
The allocation of resources to reduce risk is 
based on objective decision making. 
The implementation of numerical criteria may 
require more resources as it may require extra 
effort to be used in risk reduction 
The development and implementation of 
such criteria can put an organization in a 




Finally, it is important also to mention that there are many low level unavoidable risks 
(sometimes referred to as “residual risks”) that may be caused by nature or be man-made. The 
risk of being injured or killed in a hurricane or an earthquake represents low level unavoidable 
risks. Similarly, with today’s technology, living near a large tank which stores a hazardous 
material is also considered a low level risk, based on the fact that a spontaneous large scale 
failure of the tank is not likely to occur, and if it does, it would be as a result of a major natural 
event such as an earthquake. These unavoidable background risks should be considered when 




Overview of Current Risk Tolerability Criteria  
Numerous risk criteria have been established by government agencies and private industry. 
Below is a discussion of various risk criteria used in the US, Europe, UK, Canada, Hong Kong 
and. The section “Summary of Worldwide Tolerability Risk Criteria” in this paper illustrates 
detailed numeric risk criteria for these mentioned areas, and other worldwide entities and 
organizations. 
The US federal government has no specific risk based criteria. The Federal Clean Air Act [11] 
and Risk Management Program (RMP) [12] define worst case zones which are used for 
emergency response planning, but not correlated with land use planning decisions. The following 
contents are examples of some criteria established in California: 
 Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACFD) defines criteria for significant risks 
associated with their RMP program [13], which has been superseded by the statewide 
California Accidental Release Program (CalARP) program [14]. It should be noted that 
the LACFD criteria do not meet the specific requirements of the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) [15] for the evaluation of worst-case events. 
 The County of Santa Barbara established public safety thresholds in 2000 addressing the 
types of development that would require detailed risk analysis and the thresholds which 
would define significance under the CEQA [15]. The Santa Barbara thresholds are based 
on F-N curves and define acceptable frequency as a function of the number of persons 
affected (i.e., a sloped line on an F-N curve). 
 Under the County of Santa Barbara Safety Element [16], the following definitions are 
used to categorize public risk: (1) Red Zone: Unacceptable for all land use planning; (2) 
Amber Zone: Acceptable for “general” urban development. However, the amber zone is 
also defined as unacceptable for highly sensitive land uses and high density residential 
areas; and (3) Green Zone: Acceptable for all land use planning. 
 As a final illustrative example of risk criteria that may be applicable to US, the NFPA 
(National Fire Protection Agency) developed a standard [17] intended to provide the 
minimum fire protection, safety, and related requirements for the location, design, 
construction, security, operation, and maintenance of liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants. 
This document provides individual risk criteria as listed in Table 02. 
Table 02: Specific Individual Risk Criteria for LNG Plants – NFPA 59A 
Criterion Annual Frequency Remarks 
Zone 1 
Risk ≤ 1.00E-05 
Not Permitted: residential, office, and retail 
Permitted: occasionally occupied development (e.g., 
pump houses, transformer stations) 
 
 
Criterion Annual Frequency Remarks 
Zone 2 
1.00E-06≤ Risk ≤ 1.00E-05 
Not Permitted: shopping centers, large-scale retail 
outlets, restaurants, etc. 
Permitted: work places, retail and ancillary services, 
residences in areas of 28 to 90 people/hectare density 
Zone 3 
3.00E-07≤ Risk ≤ 1.00E-06 
Not Permitted: churches, schools, hospitals, major 
public assembly areas, and other sensitive 
establishments 
Permitted:  all other structures and activities 
Europe, particularly the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands, have been developing risk 
criteria for the last 40 years. These are detailed in the report “Societal Risks” [18], and are 
summarized below. In 1996, the European Union Council Directive on the control of major-
accident hazards (the so-called Seveso Directive [19]) was adopted. Member States had two 
years to meet the regulations set by the Directive. Since 1999, these regulations have become 
mandatory for the industry, and public authorities of Member States are now responsible for the 
implementation and enforcement of this Directive. 
The UK has published a number of documents correlated with risk criteria, and the levels that are 
considered “tolerable” have been constantly changing since 1970. The HSE (Health and Safety 
Executive) published the “Tolerability of Risk Criteria” document [20], which addresses some 
levels for fixed facilities and transport activities. The UK HSE has also published the PADHI 
(Planning Advice for Developments near Hazardous Installations [21]) levels report, which 
describes acceptable criteria as listed below in Table 03 and Table 04.  
Table 03: UK HSE Planning Advice for Developments near Hazardous Installations 
Sensitivity Description and Examples Criteria 
Level 1 
Based on normal working population – parking areas, 
warehouses, non-retail, less than 100 occupants, minor 
transportation links. 
Ok in all zones  
< 1.00E-05 
Level 2 
Based on the general public – at home and involved in 
normal activities – residential units less than 40 per hectare, 
hotels, motels up to 100 beds, major transport links, retail 
less than 5000 m2, gatherings of less than 100 people. 
Ok in middle and 
outer zones only  
< 1.00E-06 
Level 3 
Based on vulnerable members of the public (children, those 
with mobility difficulties or those unable to recognize 
physical danger) – more than 100 beds, more than 40 units 





Sensitivity Description and Examples Criteria 
per hectare, more than 100 people outdoors, hospitals 24 hr 
care < 0.25 hectare prisons. 
Level 4 
Large examples of Level 3 and large outdoor examples of 
Level 2 – theme parks, stadiums, open air areas with more 
than 1000 people, hospitals > 0.25 hectare, daycare larger 
than 1.4 hectare. 




Table 04: UK HSE Consultation Zones 












Receiving a “dangerous dose” or worse. This criterion is 
appropriate for highly vulnerable or very large public facilities. 
The Netherlands adopted specific risk criteria around 1980 and later updated it in 1996. These 
criteria are shown from Table 07 through Table 10, and Figure 04. These levels are based on 
three regions: an unacceptable region, a region where reductions are desired, and an acceptable 
region. Note that the Santa Barbara County policy described above is based on the Netherlands 
policy. 
In response to the expansion and development of oil / LPG terminals in Tsing Yi Island, and the 
residential development nearby, the Hong Kong government developed specific risk criteria in 
1988, later updated in 1993. These criteria are shown from Table 07 through Table 10, and 
Figure 04. 
The criteria in France only considers the “worst credible” consequences of accidents, and is used 
to define the safety distance around hazardous establishments. Zone distances are based on the 
distance which produces a 1% fatality rate (for the inner zone) and the distance to which 
irreversible health effects occur (for the outer zone). Inner zone areas do not allow any additional 
development that could lead to a population increase. The zone between the inner and outer 
zones allows limited and low density housing development. All development is allowed beyond 
the outer zone, as listed in Table 05 below.  
Table 05: Risk Criteria Used in France 
Type of Risks and Facilities Type of Accident Scenario 
Risks linked to liquefied combustible gas 
facilities (fixed, semi-mobile or mobile) 
Scenario A: 
BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor 
Explosion) 
Scenario B: 
VCE (Vapor Cloud Explosion) 
Risks linked to vessels containing liquefied 
or non-liquefied toxic gases where the 
containment is not designed to resist 
Scenario C: 
Total instantaneous loss of containment 
 
 
Type of Risks and Facilities Type of Accident Scenario 
external damage or internal reactions of 
products 
Risks linked to vessels containing toxic 
gases where the containment is designed to 
resist external damage or internal reactions 
of products 
Scenario D: 
Instantaneous rupture of the largest pipeline 
leading to the highest mass flow 
Risks linked to large vessels containing 
flammable liquids 
Scenario E: 
▪Fire in the largest tank 
▪Explosion of the gas phase for fixed roof tanks 
▪Fireball and projection of burning product due 
to boil-over 
Risks linked to use or storage of explosives 
Scenario F: 
Explosion of the largest mass of explosive 
present or explosion due to a reaction 
The Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada (MIACC [22]) was dissolved in the fall of 
1999. Their risk criteria were based on frequency and land use types as listed in Table 06. 
Table 06: Risk Criteria used in Canada 
Frequency Level Type of Zone Allowed Land Uses 
>1.00E-04 Buffer zone None 
>1.00E-05 Municipality transition zone Manufacturing, open spaces, golf courses 
>1.00E-06 Municipality transition zone Commercial, low density residential 






Summary of Worldwide Tolerability Risk Criteria 
Numerous risk criteria established by government agencies and private industry for both public 
and workers are summarized from Table 07 through Table 10. Furthermore, Figure 04 
illustrates different societal risk criteria for public from several worldwide entities. Most of these 
numeric criteria have been extracted from reference [23]. 
It is important to clarify the meaning of the following two concepts illustrated below from Table 
07 through Table 10:  
 Upper limit: defined as the high risk region limit (i.e., intolerable risk level if the actual 
risk is above this limit); and  
 Lower limit: defined as the negligible risk region (i.e., broadly acceptable risk level if the 
actual risk is below this limit).  
The concepts of upper and lower limits can be understood via the definition of ALARP provided 
by HSE [20] as follows: 
 Unacceptable Region: Except under extraordinary circumstances, control measures must 
be undertaken to reduce the risk to a level deemed tolerable irrespective of the 
cost/benefit. 
 Tolerable Region: In this region, the residual risk must be at an ALARP level. A 
proposed control must be implemented if the investment (e.g., in money, time, trouble of 
cost) is not in gross disproportion to the benefits achieved by implementing this control 
(e.g., the reduction in risk). What constitutes “gross disproportion” will depend on the 
level of risk (i.e., for a given level of benefit, the higher the associated level of residual 
risk, the greater the degree of disproportion necessary for it to be considered ALARP). 
 Broadly Acceptable Region: Residual risk is generally regarded as insignificant and 
adequately controlled. Risk controls should still be implemented in those cases where the 
benefits still outweigh the costs. 
 
 















UK HSE/Fixed facilities and 






Upper and Lower Limits: applies to both passengers and 
public ashore 
1.00E-05 1.00E-07 State of Victoria, Australia 
Upper Limit: New facilities. If risk exceeds 1.00E-05 
fatality/year at the boundary of an existing facility, risk 
reduction measures must be taken. Non-mandatory, can be 
used as part of safety case 
Lower Limit: non-mandatory, can be used as part of safety 
case  
1.00E-05 1.00E-6 
State of Sao Paulo, Brazil/Fixed 
installations 
Upper and Lower Limits: New installations and significant 
modifications to existing 
1.00E-05 1.00E-06 
State of Rio Grande do Sul, 
Brazil/Fixed installations 
Upper and Lower Limits: New installations 
1.00E-05 1.00E-06 Hungary No comments 
1.00E-05 1.00E-06 
International Maritime 
Organization (IMO)/New ships 










5.00E-5 Australia, State of Queensland 
Specifies that 5.00E-05 fatality/year risk contour must not extend beyond site 
boundary for new facilities. 
For existing facilities, risk reduction is to be "encouraged" if 5.00E-5 fatality/year 
risk contour extends beyond site boundary. 
5.00E-5 Singapore 
Specifies that the 5.00E-05 fatality/year risk contour may only extend into 
industrial development zones. 
1.00E-05 Hong Kong 
New installations. Existing installations exceeding this value should seek risk 
reductions 
1.00E-05 Netherlands 
Applies to vulnerable objects. Existing situations. 
Interim value, existing situations must meet value for new situations (1.00E-06 
fatality/year, see below) by 2010 
1.00E-05 
Canada, Major Industrial 
Accidents Council of Canada 
(MIACC) 
Uses this value for low density residential, and lower value (1.00E-06 
fatality/year) for high density residential. 
1.00E-05 Czech Republic 
Limit for existing installations. Risk reduction must be carried out for facilities 
above this limit. 
1.00E-05 
State of Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil/Fixed installations and 
pipelines 
For existing facilities 
5.00E-06 Singapore 
Specifies that the 5.00E-06 fatality/year risk contour may only extend into 








Applies to: (1) new permits for fixed installations, (2) new land use plans, and (3) 
transport of dangerous goods, including transport by pipelines 
1.00E-06 
State of Western Australia, 
Australia 
New installations. Higher limits are established for industrial and non-industrial 
developments.  
Lower limits (5.00E-07 fatality/year) are established for "sensitive" exposures. 
Existing installations are to 
seek risk reductions to meet requirements for new installations. 
1.00E-06 
State of New South Wales, 
Australia 
Higher limits are established for industrial and nonindustrial developments.  
Lower limits (5.00E-07 fatality/year) are established for "sensitive" exposures. 
1.00E-06 State of Queensland, Australia 
Higher limits are established for industrial and nonindustrial developments.  
Lower limits (5.00E-07 fatality/year) are established for "sensitive" exposures. 
1.00E-06 
State of Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil/Fixed installations and 
pipelines 
For new facilities 
1.00E-06 Czech Republic For new facilities 
1.00E-06 




California, Santa Barbara 
County 
Used as a screening value. Risk in excess of this value requires a risk assessment 
examining the societal risk from the facility 
1.00E-06 Singapore 
Specifies that the 1.00E-06 fatality/year risk contour may only extend into 








Malaysia: higher risk criteria established for those on industrial facilities, exposed 
from outside source. 
1.00E-07 
US NRC/Risk of “prompt” 
fatalities from nuclear power 
accidents 
Calculated from the criterion that risks should not exceed 0.1% of prompt fatality 
risks from all other accidental sources, assuming an accidental fatality rate of 
1.00E-04 fatality/year 
 











Upper Limit: for crew members on existing ships 
Lower Limit: for crew members on new or existing ships 
1.00E-03 1.00E-04 
State of Western Australia, 
Australia 
Upper Limit: proposed for existing facilities. Where an 
existing facility exceeds 1.00E-03 fatality/year, a risk 
reduction program with an agreed time frame must be 
implemented to achieve 1.00E-03 fatality/year 
Lower Limit: proposed for new and existing facilities 
5.00E-04 1.00E-04 
State of Western Australia, 
Australia 
Upper Limit: proposed for new facilities 
Lower Limit: proposed for new and existing facilities 
1.00E-04 1.00E-06 
International Maritime 
Organization (IMO)/New ships 
Upper Limit: for crew members on existing ships 






















Risk criteria should be defined in order to achieve and implement an objective decision-making 
process. In many countries around the world, regulatory requirements for performing a 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) have not yet been established. In these cases, 
internationally recognized methods required for implementing a QRA, and used by major 
international oil companies, should be considered. The criteria to be implemented for both 
individual and societal risk should contain the following three key characteristics: (1) Up-to-date; 
(2) Applicable to the Chemical Process Industry (CPI); and (3) Applicable to existing and new 
facilities. 
Regulatory and government agencies, and/or industry associations, working together with the 
affected public and workforce can best recommend what levels of risk are tolerable, and when no 
further risk reduction actions are required. Most of the relevant quantitative risk criteria have 
been issued by worldwide governmental bodies, often with significant public input and/or 
scrutiny, indicating a high degree of societal endorsement of the values. As a result, the risk 
criteria values to be proposed or followed in risk assessments need to be based on worldwide 
regulatory and industry publications. There are at least three key aspects that are commonly used 
in the development of many generally accepted and recognized risk criteria:  
 A comprehensive risk management program must address both individual and societal 
risk;  
 Risk criteria for the public must be lower, i.e. more conservative, than those for the 
workforce since the workforce risk is considered to be voluntary. 
 With respect to individual risk, new facilities should be held to a higher level of risk 
performance than existing facilities. For new facilities many opportunities exist to apply 
new/advanced risk reduction technologies. To the contrary, societal risk criteria are 
universally identical for new and existing situations. If a potential exists for major 
accident events affecting large numbers of people, most regulators have judged that older 
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